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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a method to measure the impact of the introduc-
tion of competition policy in a country on the performance of an industry.
Our method employs the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO).
We apply the method to the Turkish cement industry, which has been
heavily investigated by the Turkish Competition Authority. The results
indicate that the degree of market power has gradually decreased in the
Turkish cement industry over time. However, we cannot detect any clear
evidence that the decrease is due to the introduction of competition policy
in Turkey.
Keywords: Competition policy; Market performance; Conduct parameter; Mar-
ket power; Cement industry
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1 Introduction
Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, Turkey has sought to become
a member of the European Union (then the European Economic Community).
During this mostly disappointing and as yet unfinished process, Turkey has
adopted many economic (like customs union) and political (like human rights
issues) laws, rules, and practices of the European Union. The most important
economic adoption, though, was the passage of the Law on the Protection of
Competition in the Turkish Parliament in 1994. As a consequence of the Law,
the Competition Authority, which is the body responsible for applying the Law,
was established in 1997.
In this study we investigate whether the implementation of the Law on
the Protection of Competition in Turkey has really been effective. For that
purpose, we select the cement industry for investigation. The cement industry
is important for a couple of reasons. First of all, Turkey is one of the largest
cement producers in the world and the largest in Europe. Obviously, the cement
industry is a very important industry for Turkey. Secondly, the cement industry
has been in the focus of the Competition Authority since it was established in
1997 and many cement plants have been subject to investigations. As a result,
we expect to see the effects of these investigations, if any, in our data. Thirdly,
cement’s physical characteristics makes it mostly a domestic product since its
value to weight ratio is low. This characteristic makes us free of international
trade and import competition considerations and lets us focus on the domestic
market. Finally, we have a unique industry-level data base of prices, production,
domestic sales, export, import, and input prices of all of the Turkish cement
producers, compiled from their annual reports, some governmental sources, and
various databases, spanning from the late 1970s to 2002. The richness of the
data increases the reliability of our economic analysis. Besides, to the best of
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our knowledge, Turkey’s competition policy has not been the subject of any
economic research up to now. Thus, this is the first study investigating the
effectiveness of competition policy implementation in Turkey.
There are other studies similar in spirit to this one for different countries.
For instance, [7] “investigate the impact of competition policy on the level and
the dynamics of firm price cost margins in two European countries, Belgium and
the Netherlands.”1 [13] makes a similar investigation for the U.S. [14] looks at
the price-cost margins in the U.S. manufacturing and aim to detect the relation
between these margins and the toughness of antitrust policy. Unlike these stud-
ies, we focus on one sector only, because we think that effects of competition
policy might not be felt evenly in every sector in a country. Some sectors are
more important or strategic than others and keeping a healthy competition in
those sectors might be a priority.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly looks at the current
competition policy in Turkey. Section 3 draws a relatively detailed portrait of
the Turkish cement industry. Section 4 presents the theoretical model within the
New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) framework. Section 5 develops
the econometric model based on the theoretical model. Section 6 discusses the
data we use. Section 7 presents the results and Section 8 concludes. Appendix
A explains the data we use in detail. Appendix B contains the most relevant
articles of the Law on the Protection of Competition.
2 Competition Policy in Turkey
Competition policy in Turkey began in 1994 with the passage of the Law on
the Protection of Competition, Law No. 4054, by the Turkish Parliament2.
1 [7], p. 841.
2For an extensive survey and assessment of Turkey’s competition policy experience, see [8].
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Article 167 of the Turkish Constitution attributed to the government the duty
and the responsibility to take measures to provide and improve healthy and
regular procedures in money, credit, capital, product, and services markets and
to prevent monopolization and cartelization created as a result of any activity or
agreement in these markets. But there was no separate body in Turkey directly
responsible for applying Article 167 until 1997 nor was there a separate law until
1994.
In 1997, three years after the passage of the Law, the Competition Authority
was established. The Competition Authority is the body responsible for apply-
ing the Law. The implementation of the Law by the Competition Authority can
be broadly summarized in three categories: Competition infringement, negative
clearance and exemption, and mergers and acquisitions.
2.1 Competition Infringement
The relevant articles here are Article 4 and Article 6 of the Law.3 Article
4 aims to prevent the distortion of competition by collusive behavior in the
form of decisions, agreements, or concerted practices between undertakings in
a certain market of goods or services. Article 4 is similar in nature to Article
85, Paragraph 1 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome4. Article 6 aims to prevent the
abuse of a dominant position by undertakings which have a dominant position
in a certain market of goods or services. Article 6 is similar to Article 86 of the
1957 Treaty of Rome5.
If it is thought that any of these articles has been infringed, either upon
application by a third party or on its own initiative, the Competition Author-
ity applies Article 40, which basically calls for either a preliminary inquiry in
3All the relevant articles are in the appendix.
4The paragraphs of the EU Treaty have been renumbered by the Treaty of Amsterdam.
So Article 85, Paragraph 1 is now Article 81, Paragraph 1, but the substance of the Article is
unchanged.
5Now Article 82
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order to decide whether it is necessary to initiate an investigation or for mov-
ing directly to an investigation. If the Competition Authority decides that an
infringement exists, then it imposes fines based on Article 16 of the Law.
2.2 Negative Clearance and Exemption
Article 5 of the Law provides for exemptions to Article 4. Under this article,
even if there exists an agreement, concerted practice, or decision which restricts
competition, the Competition Authority may declare an exemption from the ap-
plication of Article 4 upon the application of the parties concerned and if certain
conditions are met. These conditions include agreements, concerted practices
and decisions which allow consumers to share from the resulting benefit, con-
tribute to new developments and progress or technical or economic improvement
in production or distribution of goods and in providing services, which do not
eliminate competition in a substantial part of the relevant market and do not
induce a restraint on competition that is more than essential to obtain the re-
sulting benefits. Article 4 is similar in nature to Article 85, Paragraph 2 of the
1957 Treaty of Rome.
2.3 Mergers and Acquisitions
Article 7 states that mergers of two or more undertakings and acquisitions of
one undertaking by another undertaking or by a person, except acquisition by
way of inheritance, either by acquisition of all or part of its assets or securities
or by other means is unlawful and prohibited if it creates or strengthens the
dominant position of one or more undertakings and as a result of which com-
petition is significantly impeded in the relevant market in the whole or part of
the territory of the State. Mergers and acquisitions require prior notification
to and permission by the Competition Authority in order to be considered as
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legally valid.
Thus, Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 altogether define the essence of Turkish com-
petition policy. The Competition Authority’s role is important here because it
has both investigation and jurisdiction power. Firms can, however, appeal its
decisions to the Council of Appeals.
3 The Turkish Cement Industry
3.1 Cement and Its Characteristics
Cement is a hydraulic binder produced by grinding clinker, which is obtained as
a result of the burning of raw materials containing calcium (limestone), silica,
aluminium oxide, and iron oxide (clay and sand) at high temperatures, with
gypsum in certain amounts. The economic characteristics of cement can be
summarized as follows. On the supply side, the main characteristics are that
• it is an intermediate (producer) good,
• its production requires high investments (large fixed costs, mainly plant
costs),
• there are scale economies in its production,
• long term storage, which is costly, is not economically feasible6, and
• its value-to-weight ratio is low, which is why transportation is costly and
shipment to destinations further than 200 kilometers is not economical.
On the demand side, the main characteristics of cement are that
• it is homogenous,
6It is not possible to store cement for long periods. Stocks are usually in the form of clinker.
However, clinker is also not storable for a long time.
6
• its price elasticity of demand is low because it has no close substitutes7,
• its demand is geographically dispersed and corresponds to the population
density, and
• its demand is seasonal as a result of changes in construction activities.
Turkey is one of the biggest cement producers in the world8. Table 1 shows
the 10 biggest cement producers for the 1995-1999 period sorted by the mag-
nitude of their average production for the period. As can be seen, Turkey is
always one of the 10 biggest producers in the world and one of the 3 biggest in
Europe.
Cement production has a long history in Turkey. The first plant was es-
tablished in 1911. However, from 1911 to the early 1950s, cement production
was carried out only by the state. In 1950s, the state launched a series of aids
to the private sector in order to encourage investments in the cement industry.
From that time on, cement plants were established by both the state and the
private sector. However, production was not enough for the domestic demand
and cement import continued until 1970s.
3.2 Production, Sales, and Distribution
Figure 2 shows production and domestic sales of cement in Turkey. As can be
seen, except for the last few years, most of the cement is used within Turkey.
Since imports are low and holding stocks is too costly, the difference between
production and domestic sales is very close to exports. Unlike the situation
in industrialized countries, the demand is increasing over time. The upward
7There are three possible substitutes for cement: asphalt in road construction and steel
and wood in building construction. However, steel and wood are not legitimate substitutes
for cement in Turkey due to their high costs.
8Two factors make Turkey one of the biggest cement producers in the world. First, Turkey
is amply endowed with the raw materials that cement production requires. Second, domestic
consumption is high, usually as high as production. See the next section.
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trend is clearly visible and the peak occurred in 1998. The major earthquake
in 1999 and the economic crisis in the following two years caused the demand
to fall. Until 1998, the trend was encouraging for the entry of new competitors.
Between 1978 to 1997, 20 new plants started to operate throughout Turkey
and 2 plants exited the industry. Out of these 20 plants, 7 belonged to new
firms entering the market, 6 belonged to already existing firms, and the other
7 belonged to the state, which eventually would be privatized. Since 1998, no
new plants have been established, but one plant exited the industry.
The distribution of cement in Turkey is carried out through two channels:
either from plants directly to the final destination or from plants to middlemen,
which distribute cement to the final destination. Among the final destinations
of cement are ready-mixed concrete companies, including the cement companies
themselves since many cement companies also produce ready mixed concrete,
construction companies, and the state. Roughly 60% of total cement sales go
to middlemen, 20% to ready-mixed concrete companies, 10% to construction
companies, and 1-2% to the state.
3.3 Ownership
Turkey’s cement industry currently consists of 57 cement plants, 39 of which
are integrated cement plants and 18 are grinding-packaging plants9. All of the
plants are in the private sector. As can be seen in Figure 1, the plants are
homogeneously distributed all over Turkey although there is a bit concentration
in the northwestern part. This is to be expected because that part of Turkey
has the highest population density and is the most developed region.
Table 2 shows plants and their owners. There are 27 cement companies oper-
9The difference between an integrated plant and a grinding-packaging plant is that an
integrated plant is capable of producing both clinker and cement whereas a grinding-packaging
plant buys clinker from outside sources and produces cement by grinding it. Thus integrated
plants have cost advantage over grinding-packaging plants in cement production.
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ating in Turkey. However, there are strong business ties among some companies
and we include them in groups. For instance, Oyak and Sabancı together have
9 integrated plants and 4 grinding-packaging mills. Similarly, Yibitas¸ and La-
farge have common and separate plants. The companies shown in the “Others”
section do not belong to a group. Those in the last 6 rows have only a single
grinding mill and are very small companies. Their annual production is usually
less than 100 thousand tons.
3.4 Capacity
The industry has almost always produced under capacity. Figure 3 shows the
total capacity and cement production from 1996 to 2002. As can be seen, cement
production has a clear, albeit gradual, decreasing trend. Nevertheless, the total
capacity shows a clear uprising trend. The result is an increasing trend in excess
capacity. It seems that the plants invested heavily in capacity, especially for the
last 6 years. The main reason for the excess capacity is state aids specifically
granted to create new capacity10. In cement production in Turkey, capacity
constraints are more likely to show themselves in clinker production.
3.5 Cost Structure
The main cost items in cement production are electricity, fuel (coal and/or
oil), labor, kraft paper for packaging, and raw materials. Table 3 shows the
main elements in the cost of cement production in Turkey. As can be seen,
the most important cost item is electricity. Fuel is the second most important
cost item. As a result of the oil crisis in 1970s, coal has replaced oil as the
main energy source for many plants11. Labor costs take the third place. Kraft
10Even the President of the TCMA complained about the situation in an address published
in the Annual Reports of the TCMA. He claimed the state aids should aim at investments for
decreasing costs rather than increasing capacity
11State Planning Institute, Cement and Concrete Report.
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paper, which is used as the packaging material in cement production, is the
fourth most important cost item. Although the ratio of bagged cement to bulk
cement has somewhat decreased over time, it was more than 50% for most of
our sample period. That’s why its share in unit cost cannot be disregarded. We
were able to collect price data for kraft paper long enough to cover the sample
period 1986-2002. That’s why we did include it in our econometric analysis.
Unfortunately we were not able to collect price data for raw materials. However
many firms have their own quarries12 but we do not have detailed information
about which firms have their own quarries and which do not. If most of the
firms have their own quarries then including prices of raw materials might not
be a good idea. In short, our econometric specification covers approximately
70% of the cost items in cement production.
3.6 Foreign Trade
The cement industry enjoyed the benefits of tariff protection until the 1980s13.
The 1980s saw Turkey open up its economy. However the industry started to
export in large amounts only recently. Imports have never been significant14.
It is interesting to observe that the sector exported in large amounts only when
the domestic demand shrank. For instance, the economic crisis of 2001 caused
the industry to export an unprecedented amount of cement. This may show
that the domestic market is profitable enough and producers turn to export
only when they...
Figure 4 shows the cement exports and imports in million tons from 1980 to
2002. As can be seen, the volume of exports were relatively high in 1980s, an
era when Turkey adopted open economy policies for the first time in its history.
The 1990s saw an even greater increase in exports. During this period, the
12Personal interview with an expert in the Turkish Cement Producers’ Association.
13[3], p. 275.
14The same is true for the raw materials that cement production requires.
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volume of exports steadily increased, reaching a record level of 6 million tons
in 2002, approximately a quarter of domestic sales. As the figure shows, during
1980s cement imports were basically zero. Late 1980s and early 1990s saw a
little bit of imports. From that date on, imports were of minor levels. Thus the
figure tells that domestic cement producers in Turkey have never faced serious
import competition.
Turkey exports cement to Africa, America, Asia, Europe, and Middle East.
But most of the cement is exported to European Union countries like Italy,
Spain, France, Ireland, and Belgium. U.S. has been the second biggest market
for Turkey, especially for the last few years. Almost all export is carried out
by sea. That gives cement companies that have plants near the coasts an edge.
The driving force behind export is Turkey’s low cement prices, which may be
due to low wages and relatively cheap raw materials. Still another factor may be
that they cut their prices15 in world markets rather than keeping their excess
production in stocks. Initially, one of our explanations behind Turkey’s low
cement prices in international markets was some form of state aids. However, a
recent report by the State Institute of Planning claims that there are no export
subsidies in the cement industry16.
Note that the fact that some cement firms export does not necessarily mean
that they make profits from it. The real issue for cement firms can be stated
as follows. Firms make production and domestic sale plans at the beginning
of each period. If, for some reason, their plans could not be realized, they find
themselves with large amounts of excess production. At this stage, the behav-
ior of cement firms depends on their location. Those firms that are close to the
coasts turn to exporting. In-land firms enter other nearby territories. In either
15The same price cut may not be likely to invoke the same amount of sales in domestic
market compared to international markets. That may be the reason the cement firms especially
turn to world markets when there is recession in the Turkish economy.
16 [12], p. 53.
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case, they cut their prices in order to sell off their excess production. This may
mean that they do not make profits at this stage. However, their other alterna-
tive, keeping excess production in stocks, is either physically impossible, if their
excess production is becoming too large, or too costly to be feasible. In either
case, cutting prices and entering other territories, domestic or international, is
a better choice.
3.7 Concentration
Concentration has been very stable in the industry over the last 25 years. Table
4 shows the various concentration measures and their summary statistics. The
four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) has a mean value of 26%. The standard
deviation is very low, showing that the mean value has not changed much dur-
ing the last 25 years. The minimum CR4 was around 25.5% in 1987 and the
maximum was around 29.5% in 2000. The 8-firm concentration ratio has also
been very stable. Over the last 25 years, its mean value was approximately
44% with a very low standard deviation. Table 4 also shows the the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), which gives a better idea about the overall situation
in the industry.
Figure 5 shows the 4-firm and 8-firm concentration ratios using production
figures over time. As can be seen, they have not changed much during the
1978-2002 period. However, there is a slight increasing trend for the last 9-10
years. This shows that the biggest 4 and 8 firms increased their share in total
production at the expense of middle-sized and small-sized firms. The increase
in concentration for the last 9-10 years is also apparent in Figure 6, which shows
HHI over time. The main reasons for the increase are twofold. First, some small
plants, e.g. Gu¨mu¨s¸hane and Stfa Dogˇal, shut down in the period. Second, the
two biggest cement plants, Akc¸imento and C¸anakkale, merged in 1996, just one
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year before the Competition Authority was established. The merged company,
Akc¸ansa, produces around 10-15% of total cement production in Turkey.
The figures indicate that there are around 8-10 big plants producing approx-
imately half of total cement production in Turkey. The rest, which is around
40 plants, are relatively small and share the other half.
3.8 External Shocks
There have been a couple of external shocks to the sector in the near past,
which changed the structure of cement production in Turkey. The earliest one
was the oil crises in the 1970s, which caused many plants to switch from fuel oil
to coal17. Currently most of the plants use coal as fuel source. Another effect of
the oil crises was that most of the plants were transformed to the dry system18.
Another negative shock, which began in 1997, was the Far East Financial Crisis.
The shock hit the Turkish cement industry in 199819.
Earthquakes create negative external shocks to the cement industry all over
the world. The major earthquake in 1999 and its after-shocks caused many
construction projects to halt. The result was a major negative effect on the
demand for cement. Finally, the worst economic crisis in Turkey, which started
in late 2000 or early in 2001 and lasted into 2002, hit the cement industry as
well as other industries. For instance, many sectors experienced negative growth
rates in 2002.
The reaction of plants to these external shocks can be divided into two
sections. On the one hand, plants that are close to the coast depended on
exports during difficult times when domestic demand shrank. On the other
hand, in-land plants competed fiercely among each other, entering each other’s
17Coal is basically petroleum coke coal, import coal, and lignite in decreasing order of usage.
18There are basically three types of cement production: wet, half-dry, and dry. The dry
system is the most energy efficient.
19Annual Reports of the Turkish Cement Manufacturers’ Association.
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territories20. They usually cut prices in order to sell excess production.
3.9 Government Intervention and Privatization
In the past, government intervention in cement industry has taken various forms,
although it has substantially decreased over time. One form of government in-
tervention is state aids aiming at capacity increases21. The main purpose of
these state aids may be a desire to avoid cement imports. The state may want
to make sure that the domestic production is always capable of satisfying do-
mestic demand. Developing countries like Turkey try to avoid imports because
they usually experience financial instabilities, which result in shortages of for-
eign currencies like the dollar. Another possible explanation is the lingering
mercantilist view Turkey still has that exports are good and imports are bad for
the country’s economy. This view gained momentum in 1980s when the state
started to grant export subsidies in large amounts to various industries.
A sign of decrease in the scale of government intervention in the industry is
privatization, which started in 1989 and ended in 1997. The number of state-
owned plants was 24 in 1988. 5 of them were sold in 1989. The second large-scale
privatization occurred in 1992, in which year 7 plants were privatized. The rest,
a total of 12 plants, were sold between 1993 and 1997. Figure 7 shows the share
of state-owned plants in total cement production between 1978 and 1998. As
can be seen, the state-owned plants were relatively small and their total share in
production was never significant. For instance, the 24 plants, around two third
of the total number of plants, produced only a third of total cement output
between 1978 and 1988. Between 1990 and 1994, state shares in 5 plants, apart
20There are implicitly drawn territories in the cement industry in Turkey. There are seven
territories, which are Aegean, Marmara, Black Sea, Central Anatolia, Mediterranean, Eastern
Anatolia, and Southeastern Anatolia, and any plant within a territory primarily aims to
sell within it. Of course, these territories do not necessarily represent economic markets or
antitrust markets. However, the Competition Authority used these territories as the bases for
defining geographic markets in cement investigations.
21See [5], p. 1.
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from the 24 plants in the privatization program, were sold to private sector. We
exclude them in Figure 7 because they were small shares and the state never
had any influence in management.
Privatization also attracted foreign capital into the sector. Currently there
are four foreign firms operating in Turkey: Lafarge Coppee (French), Hei-
delberger Zement/CBR (German), Ciment Francais-Italcementi joint venture
(Italian-French), and Ciment Vicat (Belgian). They are among the 10 leading
companies in world cement production.
Another sign of decrease in the scale of government intervention was the
relaxation of price controls in the industry following the open economy policies
adopted at the beginning of 1980s, which changed the face of cement industry
as well as many other industries. For instance, until 1982, cement prices were
determined by the state22. In 1982, the Ministry of Industry authorized the
Turkish Cement Manufacturers’ Association to determine cement prices subject
to its approval. Cement prices were completely set free in December 1985 and
have been determined by the market conditions since then.
3.10 Cement Industry Investigations
The cement industry has a rich history of antitrust cases all over the world.
The Turkish cement industry is not an exception. The industry has often been
the subject of investigations by the Competition Authority. These investiga-
tions mostly concerned collusive behavior in the form of price setting in local
markets. In the last few years the cement producers in Mediterranean, Aegean,
Marmara, and Central Anatolia regions, which produce approximately 75 per-
cent of total cement production in Turkey, were subject to a series of collusive
behavior investigations and were found guilty and penalized. Other investiga-
tions concerned whether some mergers or acquisitions violate Article 7 of the
22Annual Reports of the Turkish Cement Manufacturers’ Association.
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Law.
The first cement industry investigation by the Competition Authority con-
cerned 5 cement companies operating on the west of Turkey. The plants were
Akc¸ansa, Batıc¸im, Batıso¨ke, C¸imentas¸, and Denizli, whose combined produc-
tion constituted around 20-30% of total cement production in Turkey. The
complaint was originally filed by the I˙zmir Trade Chamber to the Ministry of
Industry and Commerce. It claimed that the cement plants applied parallel
prices. On February 21, 1997, the Ministry decided to convey the complaint to
the Competition Authority, which was not established yet. When the Authority
was established later in the same year, the Board immediately decided to start
an initial examination. The initial examination report suggested the need for
a preliminary research and the preliminary research report suggested an inves-
tigation though the research committee was not able to find any evidence for
parallel pricing. The investigation committee determined the relevant product
market as Portland cement, Portland pozzolana cement, and Portland limestone
cement and determined the relevant geographic market as Aegean, obeying the
implicit territorial classification we mentioned earlier. The investigation com-
mittee claimed that the plants determined their annual sales collusively, shared
the relevant geographical market, determined prices outside the market con-
ditions through continuous meetings, and created an export cartel in order to
keep a certain domestic price level. The Competition Board announced its de-
cision on June 17, 1999 and penalized the five cement firms. The cement firms
immediately appealed the decision. As of 2002, the case is still pending in the
courts.
Table 5 shows the firms and the monetary fines. The fines are fixed by
the Law in Turkish Liras in 1999. The second column in the table shows the
fines in 1999 dollars and the third column shows them in 2002 dollars. Since the
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exchange rate of the dollar to the Turkish Lira increased about 3.5 times between
1999 and 200223, the real value of the fines substantially decreased. This case
is a generic example of the situation of the competition policy implementation
in Turkey.
The second cement industry investigation, which was decided by the Com-
petition Authority on its own initiative on June 20, 2000, was much bigger in
scale. The Authority decided to simultaneously investigate the cement plants
operating in Central Anatolia, Marmara, and Mediterranean regions. The inves-
tigation included 21 cement plants24. The investigation concerned price fixing
and market sharing issues. The investigation committee determined the relevant
product market as Portland gray cement and blended Portland gray cement and
the relevant geographic markets as Central Anatolia, Marmara, and Mediter-
ranean. The Competition Board decided on February 2, 2002 and penalized 18
of the 21 cement companies investigated25 Table 6 shows the monetary fines in
dollars26.
4 The Theoretical Model
We use the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) approach originated
by [1] and [9]. The NEIO approach, using aggregated industry data and spec-
ifying a demand and a supply equation, estimates the degree of market power
in an oligopoly market. A clear exposition can be found in [11]. We follow [1].
Let the demand function be
23One dollar was 412,533 TL in June 1999 and 1,507,230 TL in 2002.
24The plants were Adana, Ado, Afyon, Akc¸ansa, Anadolu, Bas¸tas¸, Batıc¸im, Bolu, Bursa,
C¸imsa, Denizli, Eskis¸ehir, Go¨ltas¸, Konya, Lafarge Aslan, Marmara, Nuh, Oysa I˙skenderun,
Oysa Nigˇde, Set, and Yibitas¸-Lafarge.
25Namely, Adana, Ado, Afyon, Akc¸ansa, Anadolu, Bas¸tas¸, Batıc¸im, Bolu, Bursa, C¸imsa,
Eskisehir, Konya, Lafarge Aslan, Nuh, I˙skenderun, Nigˇde, Set, and Yibitas¸-Lafarge.
26One dollar was 1,386,051 TL in February 2002.
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Q = D (P, Y, Z;α) + 
where Q is quantity, P is price, Y is a vector of exogenous variables shifting the
demand curve, e.g. income, and Z is another vector of exogenous variables ro-
tating demand curve, e.g. price of a substitute good, α is a vector of parameters
to be estimated,  is the error term, and D(·) is the demand function.
If the sellers in the market are price takers, then price, marginal revenue,
and marginal cost are equal in long-run equilibrium and the supply equation
can be expressed as
P = c(Q,W ;β) + η
where W is a vector of exogenous variables affecting the supply side, e.g. factor
prices, β is the vector of parameters to be estimated, η is the error term, and
c(·) is the marginal cost function.
If the sellers are not price takers, then perceived marginal revenue, instead
of price, and marginal cost will be equal. Now we have a supply relation in the
form of
P = c(Q,W ;β)− λ · h(Q,Y, Z;α) + η
where λ is a conduct parameter measuring the degree of market power and
h(·) is the first derivative of the inverse demand function with respect to Q
times Q27. Note that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. If the market is perfectly competitive,
then λ = 0 and price equals marginal cost. If the market is monopoly, then
λ = 1 and monopoly marginal revenue, P + h(·), not price, equals marginal
cost. 0 < λ < 1 corresponds to various degrees of market power for oligopolistic
27See [11], fn. 3
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markets and P + λ · h(·), which is called perceived marginal revenue, equals
marginal cost.
If demand function, D(·), is linear in the variables, then there is an identifi-
cation problem of λ. [1] solved this problem by defining a demand curve which
is nonlinear in a special way. His demand function specification is
Q = α0 + α1P + α2Y + α3PZ + α4Z + , (1)
where the interaction term PZ implies that the demand function rotates when
the exogenous variables vector changes in value. If we also specify the marginal
cost function as
MC = β0 + βQQ + βW W,
then the supply relation is given by
P = β0 + βQQ + βW W − λ
[
Q
α1 + α3Z
]
+ η. (2)
Note that
h(Q,Z;α) =
[
Q
α1 + α3Z
]
,
which is the first partial derivative of the inverse demand function with respect
to Q multiplied by Q. In practice one estimates equations (1) and (2) together.
5 The Econometric Model
The empirical analysis begins with the specification of a demand equation for
cement. Our demand specification is very simple:
Qt = α0 + α1Pt + α2TCEt + εt (3)
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where t is a period in time, Qt is the quantity of cement shipped at time t, Pt is
the price of cement at time t, and TCEt is the total, housing plus non-housing
(infrastructure), construction expenditures at time t. Unlike some other studies,
e.g. [6], [2], and [10], we do not include the price of a substitute good for cement
in the demand specification. The reason is that there is no good substitute for
cement in Turkey. Steel and wood may be considered as substitutes for cement in
housing construction. But in Turkey almost all housing construction uses bricks
or concrete as the main ingredient and cement is used as the main product to
bind bricks and it is the main ingredient in concrete. Note that this is not the
case in the U.S. where, for instance, wood is used in many construction projects,
which is almost never the case in Turkey. As to non-housing construction28, only
asphalt can be considered as a feasible substitute for cement. But asphalt is
used only in inter-city road construction and thus constitutes a minor part of
non-housing construction.
Although some construction projects may last longer than a year and this
may affect the future demand for cement, we do not include any lagged housing
and/or non-housing construction expenditures because they did not turn out to
be statistically significant in our experiments with different demand specifica-
tions, which implies that most of the projects are finished within a year. Also
using total construction expenditures instead of using housing and non-housing
construction expenditures separately conserves degrees of freedom without any
significant changes in the results for the demand estimation. Finally, we expect
α1 to be negative and α2 positive.
The specification of the supply side begins with the marginal revenue equa-
tion. If the cement market is perfectly competitive, then the marginal revenue
is equal to price. But if there is imperfect competition in the cement market,
28Non-housing construction is basically composed of construction of roads, bridges, and
dams.
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then the perceived marginal revenue is
MRt = Pt + λ
Qt
α1
where λ is the conduct parameter. λ is specified to be between zero and one. For
instance, if λ = 0, then the cement market is perfectly competitive. If it is one,
then a monopoly or perfect cartel applies. Cournot equilibrium has λ = 1/n if
there are n identical firms in the market.
Since the equality of marginal cost and marginal revenue is the profit max-
imization condition and is independent of market type, the next thing to do
is to specify the marginal cost equation for the cement industry. In cement
production, we assume that marginal cost depends only on input prices29:
MCt = c (PLt, PEt, PCt)
where PEt is the price of electricity, PCt is the price of coal, and PLt is the
price of labor. Our MC specification, linear in input prices30, is
MCt = β0 + β1PLt + β2PEt + β3PCt + δt
If we equate the marginal revenue and the marginal cost equations and arrange,
we get
Pt = β0 + β1PLt + β2PEt + β3PCt − λ
(
Qt
α1
)
+ δt (4)
We are going to specify λ in such a way that it will let us capture the impact
29The theoretical framework assumes that the firms are price-takers in input markets. The
prices of electricity, coal, and kraft paper are exogenous in the cement industry since they
are either produced by the state or imported. The only input price that cement firms may
have control over is labor. However, Turkey has been applying a minimum-wage rule for years
under which it is illegal for employers to employ workers, which prevents firms from enforcing
their buyer powers.
30Note that this implies a linear total cost function.
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of the competition policy introduction on the performance of the Turkish cement
industry. We have three different specifications31:
λ1t = λ
1
0
+ λ1
1
T + ε1t
λ2t = λ
2
0
+ λ2
2
D97 + ε2t
λ3t = λ
3
0
+ λ3
1
T + λ3
2
D97 + ε3t
where D97 is a dummy variable taking a value of 0 before 1997 and 1 after, and
including, 1997 since 1997 is the year that competition policy was effectively
introduced and T is a time trend32. We include the dummy variable to test
whether or not the introduction of competition policy had an immediate effect
on market performance. If λ2 turns out to be statistically insignificant, then
we can conclude that introduction of competition policy did not have a discrete
impact on the cement industry. We include the time trend to test whether the
value of the market power parameter decreases (λ1 < 0) or increases (λ1 > 0)
over time. This specification will also let us make some inferences. For instance,
if both of the parameters turn out to be statistically significant and λ2 < 0, then
we can conclude that the competition policy implementation has been effective
at decreasing the market power in the cement industry over time.
Adding our most general conduct parameter specification for λt, the equation
becomes
Pt = β0 + β1PLt + β2PEt + β3PCt
(
λ3
0
+ λ3
1
T + λ3
2
D97
) (Qt
α1
)
+ ξt (5)
31Similar specifications for the conduct parameter appear in [6], p. 395. and [2], p. 1004.
32Of course, it is a possibility that the conduct parameter might be a nonlinear function of
time. What we do here is to take a linear approximation.
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where
ξt = δt −
(
Qt
α1
)
ε3t
and similarly for the other two specifications. Note that this introduces het-
eroscedasticity into the model. We use nonlinear three-stage least-squares to
estimate the non-linear simultaneous equations system composed of equations
3 and 4.
6 Data
Our data set includes 9 variables and covers 1986-2002 period. We have data
for the earlier years but exclude them from our estimations since cement prices
were freely determined in the market only with the beginning of 1986. Table 7
presents some summary statistics of the data. All monetary series are deflated
with the consumer price index taking 1995 as the base year in order to remove
the inflationary effects.
The endogenous variables are domestic cement sales (Q) and real cement
prices (P). Domestic cement sales are measured in million tons. The table shows
that domestic cement sales was around 27 million tons on average between 1986
and 2002. Real cement prices are measured in million Turkish Liras (TL) with
a base year of 1995.
The exogenous variables are twofold: demand side and supply side vari-
ables. On the demand side, the exogenous variable is real total construction
expenditures (TCE) measured in trillion TL. On the supply side, the exogenous
variables are the prices of labor (PL), electricity (PE), coal (PC), and kraft pa-
per (PK). The price of labor is measured in million TL, the price of electricity
in thousand TL, the price of coal in million TL, and the price of kraft paper in
million TL.
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The other exogenous variables are time and competition policy dummy.
Time variable is a sequence starting from 1 and ending in 17. Dummy vari-
able takes a value of zero before the introduction of competition policy and zero
after it.
7 Estimation and Results
In this section, we present our results. Our estimation technique is nonlinear
three-stage least-squares33. During the estimation process, we used all the ex-
ogenous variables and their squares as the instruments (following [4], p. 440).
Table 8 shows the estimation results for different system specifications.
The main purpose of model 1 is to estimate the market power in the ce-
ment industry. Each variable is statistically significant at least at 5% level of
significance. The signs of the variables are as expected. On the demand side,
we experimented with once- and twice-lagged total construction expenditures
but they never turned out to be significant. It seems that most of the con-
struction projects are finished within a year. We also experimented with the
price of asphalt, the price of a substitute good for cement. It also did not give
statistically significant results, which suggests that asphalt is a weak substitute
for cement. We decided to include total construction expenditures instead of
including housing and non-housing (infra-structure) construction expenditures
separately in order to conserve the degrees of freedom. On the supply side,
the results show that each of the inputs is significant in cement production and
has a significant contribution to the value of constant marginal cost. The value
of the conduct parameter shows that the cement industry as a whole enjoyed
some degree of market power over the sample period. In other words, if we
33We use the PROC MODEL and PROC IML procedures in SAS for the estimations. The
convergence criteria is 1.e-8 and the numerical optimization method is Gauss-Newton. The
SAS code, including the data used in the estimations, is available from the author upon
request.
24
assume that the industry is composed of a single firm, this firm has some degree
of market power. Since the industry is composed of many firms, the conduct
parameter shows the average degree of market power over the firms34.
Model 2 looks at the change of the conduct parameter over time, keeping
demand and supply specifications the same. It assumes that the conduct pa-
rameter is a linear function of time. The results indicate that the market power
gradually decreased in the cement industry over time. The coefficient of the
time variable is statistically significant at the 10% significance level. A nat-
ural question here is whether the introduction of the competition policy had
something to do with the fact that the market power gradually decreased 1986
through 2002.
Model 3 assumes that the conduct parameter is a linear function of a dummy
variable which takes a value of zero before 1997 and a value of 1 after and in-
cluding 1997. The results are surprising. We find that the introduction of
competition policy had no effect on the market power in the cement industry
since the coefficient of the dummy variable is not statistically different from zero.
The estimation of λ0 shows that the market power before the introduction of
competition policy was around 0.415. The introduction of competition policy
seems to have a positive effect on the degree of market power. However, the λ2
coefficient is not statistically different from zero. So we conclude that compe-
tition policy had no effect in the cement industry. Since the other parameters
are approximately the same as in Models 1 and 2, the specification seems to be
robust.
Finally, Model 4 assumes that the conduct parameter is a function of both
time and the dummy variable. This formulation will let us look at the imme-
diate effects of the introduction of competition policy in a better way since the
time variable controls the change in the market power over time. The results
34See [10], p. 53.
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corroborate our earlier findings. The coefficient of the dummy variable is still
not statistically different from zero, which once again shows that the introduc-
tion of competition policy had no apparent effect on the market performance of
the cement industry. On the other hand, the coefficient of the time variable is
still negative and statistically significant at the same degree, showing once more
that the market power gradually decreased for the time interval between 1986
and 2002.
The fit measures R2 and R¯2 are very high for both demand and supply
equations for every model, showing that our specifications fit the data very
well. The LM p-value rows show the p-values of the Lagrange Multiplier test
for serial correlation in the error terms and the DW statistic rows show the
Durbin-Watson test statistics for the same purpose. The demand equation is
free of serial correlation as both the LM test and the DW test show. The supply
equation is also free of serial correlation when the specification includes a time
trend, which is model 2 and model 4. We get mixed results for models 1 and 3.
The LM test shows the existence of serial correlation in these models. However,
the DW test statistic for these models fall into the no serial correlation area.
We conclude that we cannot clearly accept the existence of serial correlation in
the specifications 1 and 3. We also use White’s test for heteroscedasticity in the
error terms and accept the null hypothesis that there is no heteroscedasticity.
In fairness to the competition policy implementation in Turkey, we also
experimented with another dummy variable in models 3 and 4, which takes a
value of zero before 1998 and 1 after and including 1998, assuming any potential
impact of the introduction of competition policy showed itself with a lag. The
results are qualitatively the same, although quantitatively different. In model
3, the coefficient of the competition policy dummy is negative this time but still
insignificant. In model 4, the time variable is again negative and significant at
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10%. The dummy variable is also negative but still insignificant. This may imply
that the impact of the introduction of competition policy may be kicking off in
time since the sign of its coefficient changed from positive in 1997 to negative
in 1998. It would be interesting to experiment with other dummy variables,
but with the current data set, these experiments would not be meaningful. We
also experimented with dummies for the external shocks mentioned in the third
section but none of them produced statistically meaningful results.
Table 9 shows the partial derivatives of the demand and supply equations
evaluated at the sample means for each model. The slope of the demand curve
is negative as expected and statistically significant for each model. The sign
of the partial derivative of the demand equation with respect to the current
total construction expenditures is positive as expected and also statistically
significant for each model. The results show that our demand specification is
very robust.
As to the supply equation, models 1 and 3 exhibit good results. The ef-
fects of the labor, electricity, coal, and kraft prices on the equilibrium price
of cement are always positive, as expected, and statistically significant. The
partial derivatives of the supply equation with respect to output are positive
and significant. Both of the models show that the market power in the cement
industry is around 0.40-0.44. Since the introduction of the competition policy
does not produce statistically significant results, we do not attempt to measure
the degree of market power before and after it. Price cost margin shows that
the real price over the sample period was around 1.2-1.4 million TL above the
constant marginal cost with 1995 prices.
Models 2 and 4 involve the time variable and it seems that it distorts the
results of the supply equations. That’s why we do not interpret them. When
we assumed that the degree of market power is a linear function of time, we did
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not assumed that a causality relation between them exists. We wanted to see if
there is a time trend in the market power and if there was, how our results would
change if we accounted for it. The results showed that there is a slight decrease
in the degree of market power. However, the relation was not too strong since
the coefficient of the time variable was significant only at a 10% level. Model 4
showed that accounting for the slight time trend did not change our results at
all.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we tried to evaluate the impact of the introduction of competition
policy on the performance of the Turkish cement industry. Based on our results,
we can conclude that the cement industry has gradually become more compet-
itive over time since the sign of the parameter of the time trend in our supply
equation is negative and the parameter itself, although small in absolute value,
is statistically significant. The Competition Authority dummy turned out to
be statistically insignificant even when we assume that it might have a lagged
impact. These results are contrary to our initial expectations and show that
the introduction of competition policy has not made the cement industry more
competitive despite all the investigations and monetary penalties. However, the
results are consistent with our finding that the competition policy implementa-
tion in Turkey has serious obstacles35. On the other hand, these results may
change over time. The impact of competition policy may show itself in the data
in the coming years.
Our method to assess the introduction of competition policy is general
enough. It can be applied in other settings. A natural extension of the method
is to use plant-level data and to delineate geographical markets and measure
35See [8].
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market power in each of them. That’s for the future research.
Appendix A
This appendix explains the data set we use in the text in more detail. The
following is a detailed discussion of the data we use.
Total Construction Expenditures (TCEt): Annual total construction expen-
ditures at 1995 prices in billions of Turkish Liras are obtained from SourceOECD
Databases, Annual National Accounts, Main Aggregates, GDP: Expenditure
Approach. It is composed of housing construction expenditures (HCEt) plus
non-housing construction expenditures (NCEt), that is, infrastructure expen-
ditures.
Price of Coal (PCt): Annual average steam coal prices per tonne for in-
dustry in 1000 Turkish Liras are obtained from International Energy Agency
(IEA) Statistics, Energy Prices and Taxes, various issues. These prices include
value added tax. We remove inflationary effects in the series by using wholesale
(producer) price index.
Price of electricity (PEt): Annual average electricity prices per kilowatt hour
for the industrial sector in 1000 Turkish Liras are obtained from International
Energy Agency (IEA) Statistics, Energy Prices and Taxes, various issues. These
prices include excise tax and value added tax. We remove inflationary effects in
these prices by using wholesale (producer) price index.
Price of labor (PLt): Annual average amount of wages and salaries per em-
ployee in manufacturing sector in billion liras are obtained by dividing the total
wages and salaries paid to employees by the number of employees for the cor-
responding year. The source is The Growth of World Industry, Volume I, Core
Data, Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, Volume I, Core Data, Industrial Statis-
tics Yearbook, Volume I, Core Statistics, all United Nations (UN) publications,
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UN Statistical Yearbook database, International Yearbook of Industrial Statis-
tics, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), various
issues. Unfortunately, the series stop at 1997. After 1997, the series is updated
by using a earning index per employee in manufacturing sector which takes 1997
as the base year and is published by the State Institute of Statistics, Turkey. We
remove inflationary effects in these prices by using wholesale (producer) price
index.
Kraft Paper Prices (PKt): Kraft paper prices were obtained from the State
Institute of Statistics.
Consumer price index (CPIt): Consumer price index numbers are obtained
from International Financial Statistics (IFS) database which takes 1995 as the
base year.
Price of cement (PCt): Annual prices of cement per ton are obtained from
the State Institute of Statistics, Turkey.
Domestic Cement Sales (Qt): Total domestic cement sales were obtained
from the annual reports of the Turkish Cement Manufacturers’ Association.
Appendix B
The following are Articles 4, 5, 6, and, 7 of the Law on the Protection of
Competition, No. 4054, which are included in Part II, Chapter One, Prohib-
ited Practices. Article 4 takes place under the heading Agreements, Concerted
Practices and Decisions Restricting Competition.
Article 4 - Agreements and concerted practices of the enterprises and de-
cisions and practices of the associations of enterprises the object or effect or
the possible impact of which is, directly or indirectly, to prevent, distort or re-
strict competition in a certain market for goods and services, are unlawful and
prohibited.
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Such practices are, in particular, as follows:
a. To fix purchase or sales prices or the factors such as cost or profit which form
the price or all other trading conditions concerning purchase and sales of
goods and services;
b. To share the markets for goods and services or to share or control the market
sources and components;
c. To control or to determine the quantities of supply or demand in the markets
for goods and services outside the market conditions;
d. To impede or restrict the activities of the competitors or to eliminate other
enterprises operating in the market by boycotts or by other practices or
to prevent the newcomers in the market;
e. Except exclusive dealing agreements, to apply dissimilar conditions to per-
sons which have equivalent transactions with equal rights and obligations;
f. Contrary to the nature of the agreement or to the commercial customary
rules, to make the conclusion of contracts subject to the purchase of other
goods and services or acceptance by the intermediary purchasers to display
of other goods and services or acceptance of resale conditions for the goods
or services concerned.
In cases where the existence of an agreement cannot be proved, if the price
changes or the balance of supply and demand or the areas of activity in the
markets of the enterprises concerned are similar to those of the markets where
competition is prevented, distorted or restricted, this constitutes a presumption
that the enterprises concerned are engaged in a concerted practice.
Each such party thereto, may avoid liability if the contrary is proven on
economic and rational grounds.
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Article 5 - The Board, in the existence of all the conditions stated below
and upon the application of the parties concerned, may declare the provisions
of Article 4 inapplicable to any agreement or concerted practice between enter-
prises or decision by associations of enterprises which:
a. Contributes to new developments and progress or technical or economic im-
provement in production or distribution of goods and in providing services;
b. Allows consumers to get a share from the resulting benefit;
and which does not:
c. Eliminate competition in a substantial part of the relevant market;
d. Induce a restraint on competition that is more than essential for the attain-
ment of the objectives set out in paragraphs (a) and (b);
A decision for exemption shall be issued for a specified period of not more
than five years. Certain conditions and/or obligations may be attached to an
exemption decision. Upon the termination of the specified period of exemption,
the decision for exemption may, upon the application of the parties concerned,
be renewed if the requirements for exemption continue to be satisfied.
In cases where the requirements stated in the first paragraph are satisfied,
the Board may issue communiqus by which certain categories of agreements
shall be exempted as a group and the conditions attached thereto are shown.
Article 6 - Any abuse, by one or more enterprises acting alone or by means
of agreements or practices, of a dominant position in a market for goods and
services within the whole or part of the territory of the State, is unlawful and
prohibited.
Abusive practices are, in particular, as follows:
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a. To prevent, directly or indirectly, other enterprises in its area of commercial
activities or practices which aim to impede the activities of the competitors
in the market;
b. To make discrimination, directly or indirectly, by way of imposing dissimilar
conditions for equivalent and same rights and obligations to the purchasers
who have equivalent position;
c. To make the conclusion of contracts subject to the acceptance of restrictions
concerning resale conditions such as the purchase of other goods and ser-
vices or acceptance by the intermediary purchasers to display other goods
and services or maintenance of a minimum resale price;
d. Practices which aim to distort competition in a market for goods and services
by means of taking financial, technological and commercial advantages
created by the dominant position in another market;
e. To restrict production, marketing or technical development thereby causing
a disadvantage for the consumers.
Article 7 - Merger of two or more enterprises and acquisition, except ac-
quisition by way of inheritance, by an enterprise or by a person, of another
enterprise, either by acquisition of all or part of its assets or securities or other
means by which that person or enterprise acquires a controlling power in that
enterprise concerned, which creates or strengthens the dominant position of one
or more enterprises as a result of which, competition is significantly impeded in
the market for goods and services in the whole or part of the territory of the
State, is unlawful and prohibited.
The Board, shall issue communiqus to announce the categories of mergers
and acquisitions which, to be considered as legally valid, require a permission
by prior notification to the Board.
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Table 1: 10 Biggest Cement Producers (Million Tons)
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
China 475.6 491.2 511.7 536.0 573.0
Japan 90.5 94.5 91.9 81.3 80.1
India 67.7 73.3 82.9 87.6 100.2
U.S. 76.9 79.3 82.6 83.9 86.0
S. Korea 56.1 58.4 60.3 46.8 48.6
Germany 38.9 37.0 37.2 38.5 38.1
Brazil 28.3 34.6 38.0 39.9 40.2
Turkey 33.2 35.2 36.0 38.2 34.3
Italy 33.7 33.3 33.7 35.5 36.8
Thailand 34.1 38.7 37.1 22.7 25.4
Source: U.N. Statistical Yearbook
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Figure 2: Production and Domestic Sales of Cement in Turkey
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Figure 3: Excess Capacity in Cement
38
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
1
2
3
4
5
6
C
em
en
t I
m
po
rt
s 
an
d 
E
xp
or
ts
 (M
ill
io
n 
To
ns
)
Years
Import Export 
Figure 4: Cement Exports and Imports
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Figure 5: 4-Firm and 8-Firm Concentration Ratios between 1978 and 2002
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Figure 6: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index between 1978 and 2002
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Table 2: Groups, Companies, and Plants
Companies Integrated Plants Grinding Mills Total
Oyak-Sabancı Group
Oyak 4 1 5
Sabancı + CBR 2 1 3
Sabancı Holding 1 1 2
Oyak + Sabancı (Oysa) 1 1 2
Oyak + GAMA 1 0 1
Rumeli Group
Rumeli 8 1 9
Yibitas-Lafarge Group
Yibitas¸ - Lafarge 2 3 5
Lafarge 1 1 2
Yibitas¸ 1 0 1
Set Group
Set 4 1 5
Others
Batı Anadolu 2 1 3
C¸imentas¸ 2 1 3
Vicat 2 0 2
Nuh Holding 1 0 1
Limak Holding 1 0 1
Go¨ltas¸ 1 0 1
Eskis¸ehir 1 0 1
Bursa 1 0 1
Denizli 1 0 1
Erc¸imsan 1 0 1
C¸imko C¸imento 1 0 1
O¨ztu¨re Kirec¸ 0 1 1
I˙kon A.S. 0 1 1
Marmara 0 1 1
I˙stas¸ 0 1 1
Ado Madencilik 0 1 1
O¨zgu¨r Beton 0 1 1
Total 39 18 57
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Table 3: Cost Items and Their Average Share
Cost Items Average Share in Unit Cost (%)
Electricity 23.5
Fuel (Oil or Coal) 20.0
Labor 14.0
Packaging & Packaging Labor 11.5
Raw Materials 9.5
Total 78.5
Source: State Planning Institute, Cement and Concrete Report
Table 4: Concentration Measures in the Turkish cement industry
Concentration N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
CR4 25 0.25983 0.017955 0.23513 0.29558
CR8 25 0.4375 0.01682 0.40674 0.46992
HHI 25 376.7104 26.225578 328.63 424.06
Table 5: First Investigation and Fines in Dollars
Plant Fines in 1999 Fines in 2002
Baticim 674,454 184,600
Akcansa 609,968 166,950
Cimentas 487,112 133,324
Batisoke 175,008 47,900
Denizli 172,493 47,212
Total 2,119,035 579,986
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Table 6: Second Investigation and Fines in Dollars
Plant Fines
Akcansa 770,772
Set 593,260
Adana 429,760
Cimsa 423,168
Yibitas-Lafarge 328,479
Bolu 298,272
Bursa 164,981
Bastas 136,748
Nigde 83,155
Iskenderun 73,433
Baticim 62,409
Nuh 54,996
Lafarge Aslan 31,719
Konya 24,289
Anadolu 18,516
Eskisehir 14,145
Afyon 11,775
Ado 7,013
Total 3,526,888
Table 7: Summary Statistics, 1986-2002 Annual Data
Series N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Endogenous variables
Q 17 27.184 4.323 18.935 34.127
P 17 2.511 0.432 1.827 3.082
Exogenous variables
TCE 17 1.004 0.145 0.703 1.186
PL 17 2.481 0.596 1.797 3.543
PE 17 3.973 0.588 3.169 5.383
PC 17 1.877 0.354 1.279 2.411
PK 17 33.333 8.034 23.043 47.131
TIME 17 9.000 5.050 1.000 17.000
D97 17 0.353 0.493 0.000 1.000
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Table 8: Four Different System Specifications
Coefficients Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Demand Equation
a0 29.55841
a 29.75011a 29.66648a 29.85175a
a1 -8.74186
a -8.90474a -8.78243a -8.92043a
a2 19.50005
a 19.71653a 19.49387a 19.65452a
R2 0.8907 0.8911 0.8908 0.8911
R¯2 0.8794 0.8798 0.8795 0.8798
DW statistic 1.4752 1.4864 1.4751 1.4824
LM p-value 0.3046 0.3133 0.3067 0.3113
White 0.2545 0.2720 0.2571 0.2722
Supply Equation
b0 -3.33282
a -0.64412 -4.26603b -1.11172
b1 0.388307
a 0.314716a 0.470086a 0.361802a
b2 0.545606
a 0.321423a 0.625881a 0.361556b
b3 0.455198
b 0.212579 0.458549b 0.210154
b4 0.018327
a 0.008348 0.02699b 0.013615
λ 0.401183b - - -
λ0 - 0.244125
c 0.415295b 0.233402
λ1 - -0.01118
c - -0.01087c
λ2 - - 0.064412 0.037396
R2 0.9164 0.9587 0.9237 0.9615
R¯2 0.8727 0.9305 0.8715 0.9276
DW statistic 2.3184 2.3148 2.4859 2.2033
LM p-value 0.0032 0.1502 0.0013 0.3854
White 0.3856 0.3856 0.3856 0.3856
a: significant at 1% using a Wald test
b: significant at 5% using a Wald test
c: significant at 10% using a Wald test
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Table 9: Partial Derivatives
Partial Derivatives Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Demand Equation
∂Qt/∂Pt -8.74186 -8.90474 -8.78243 -8.92043
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
∂Qt/∂TCEt 19.50005 19.71653 19.49387 19.65452
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Supply Equation
∂Pt/∂PLt 0.38831 0.31472 0.47009 0.36180
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004)
∂Pt/∂PEt 0.54561 0.32142 0.62588 0.35156
(<0.0001) (0.0047) (0.0003) (0.0147)
∂Pt/∂PCt 0.45520 0.21258 0.45855 0.21015
(0.0220) (0.2226) (0.0273) (0.2446)
∂Pt/∂PKt 0.01833 0.00835 0.02699 0.01362
(0.0008) (0.2368) (0.0104) (0.1997)
∂Pt/∂Qt 0.04589 0.01612 0.04988 0.01668
(0.0362) (0.7314) (0.0427) (0.6518)
Market Power Measures
Conduct Parameter 0.40118 0.14354 0.43803 0.14878
(0.0403) (0.7315) (0.0472) (0.6521)
Price-Cost Margin 1.24751 0.43819 1.35580 0.45338
(0.0362) (0.7333) (0.0427) (0.6518)
Lerner Index 0.49680 0.17450 0.53992 0.18055
(0.0362) (0.7333) (0.0427) (0.6518)
Wald test p-values are in parentheses
47
